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Abstract
This paper shows that it may be socially optimal to grant accident victims less
than full compensation. In our framework, ﬁrms are liable under product liability but
also invest in care to prevent consumers switching to competitors. Aﬀecting the par-
tition of consumers by means of care-taking is not desirable from a social standpoint.
Consequently, it may be optimal to reduce liability below full compensation in order
to adjust ﬁrms’ care incentives.
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11 Introduction
Victims of product-related accidents are usually not fully compensated. This holds, for
instance, because nonpecuniary losses are often not actionable (see, e.g., Endres and L¨ udecke
1998; Posner 1998; Shavell 2004). In the standard framework of the economic analysis of tort
law, less than full compensation will induce ineﬃcient care choices if injurers are individuals,
or if injurers are ﬁrms but victims are strangers (Shavell 2007). Given perfect information,
less than full compensation does not cause ineﬃciencies if injurers are ﬁrms and victims are
consumers. This holds because consumers consider their total costs entailing both the price
paid to the ﬁrm and the expected harm borne by the consumer. Under perfect information,
whether expected liability is allocated more towards the ﬁrm or the consumer is therefore
without consequence for the eﬃciency of the outcome. In contrast, the literature on product
liability ﬁnds that if consumers are imperfectly informed, imposing full liability on the ﬁrm is
justiﬁed for eﬃciency reasons in most circumstances (Geistfeld 2009). From that perspective,
the practice of not fully compensating accident victims may be seen as ineﬃcient.
We show that it may be eﬃciency-enhancing to grant accident victims less than full
compensation. In our product-liability setting, ﬁrms may invest excessively in care in order
to attract customers. This makes it socially optimal to reduce ﬁrm liability below the level
of full victim compensation in order to adjust care incentives.
Our result is derived within the following framework. Two heterogenous ﬁrms compete
via prices and precaution in two periods, in which consumers do not observe care invested
by the ﬁrm before the purchase of the good, but form rational expectations regarding the
level of precaution. We consider the product to be an experience good, i.e. consumers
become informed about the level of precaution after the purchase, which often holds true in
reality (Polinsky and Shavell, forthcoming). More precisely, consumers get informed about
the probability of product-related accidents for each ﬁrm. This information may be provided
by, e.g., consumer safety groups and allows for an assessment of care taken by ﬁrms. Given
ﬁrst-period care choices by both ﬁrms, in the second period consumers are attracted to the
ﬁrm with relatively high care, i.e. consumers punish ﬁrms whose products were characterized
by a relatively higher accident probability. Firms anticipate this switching of consumers due
to a comparison of ﬁrst-period precaution levels and exert excessive precaution if victim
compensation is full.
2In our set-up, consumer choice of one of the two ﬁrms in the second period depends on
ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-period care choices. In making this assumption, we incorporate the fact that
consumers may perceive a ﬁrm supplying a good in period 1 with a relatively low care
level as unfair. Empirical evidence from studies investigating reciprocal behavior shows
that the perception of being treated unfairly provokes retaliatory action (see, e.g. Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1993; Fehr, G¨ achter and Kirchsteiger 1997; Bewley 1999; Fehr and
G¨ achter 2000; Hannan, Kagel and Moser 2002; Kube, Mar´ echal and Puppe 2007). There
are theoretical papers which explicitly draw on these ﬁndings (see, e.g., Rabin 1993; Falk
and Fischbacher 2006). Our framework is conceptually very close to the study by Huck
and Tyran (2007), which analyzes reciprocal consumers who punish ﬁrms for providing low
quality by terminating the relation to the supplier.1 In an experimental setting, Renner and
Tyran (2004) show that this kind of reciprocity increases average product quality, a ﬁnding
consistent with our argument. As an empirical case in point for our setting, the accounting
company KPMG Germany suﬀered an unusual loss of clients subsequent to a well-publicized
auditing failure in 2002 (Weber et al. 2008). In our case, retaliatory action by consumers
also takes the form of switching the supplier, possibly even if other characteristics of the
goods are equal. As a consequence, ﬁrms would exert precaution even if product liability
were absent. This argument is also forcefully made in Polinsky and Shavell (forthcoming).
We argue, therefore, that it may be eﬃciency-enhancing not to compensate accident victims
to the full extent. The combined force of the threat of consumer switching and full liability
would otherwise provoke excessive precaution.
In the literature on the economic analysis of tort law, the level of compensation and
deviations from awarded damages to the level of harm have often been subject to scrutiny
(Visscher 2009). Cooter and Porat (2001) present an initial analysis of the consequences
of nonlegal sanctions on the optimal level of compensation, also relating to reputational
concerns. In addition, four areas are of particular importance. First, usually not all cases
are ﬁled. This calls for compensation in excess of the harm suﬀered in accordance with the
punitive damages multiplier (Shavell 2007). Second, it may be that injurers are incapable of
compensating victims in some cases, i.e. that injurers are judgment proof. It has been shown
1More generally, our model contributes to the literature that models consumers as partly irrational (see,
e.g, DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004; K¨ oszegi 2005; Eliaz and Spiegler 2006; Heidhues and K¨ oszegi 2008;
Heidhues and K¨ oszegi 2009).
3for the case in which the magnitude of harm is uncertain that, from a policy perspective, it
may be optimal for care incentives to lower (increase) compensation below (above) the level
of harm for some realizations of the random harm variable (see, e.g., Lewis and Sappington
1999). Third, victims are often heterogeneous with respect to the level of harm suﬀered in
the event of an accident. This brings the accuracy of damages and the value of accurate
damages into focus (Kaplow and Shavell 1996). Finally, if parties to the accident are risk
averse and strict liability applies, it is optimal to compensate less than the level of harm as
a consequence of accounting for risk-bearing costs in social costs, and induce risk-sharing
(Shavell 2007). All of these additional aspects have no direct bearing on our pursuit.
There is a vast literature on the economics of product liability (see Geistfeld 2009 for a
recent survey). For instance, Daughety and Reinganum (2008) consider voluntary disclosure
of risk-related information via price signaling or costly disclosure, two aspects from which
we abstract. We also do not consider the possibility of contractually speciﬁed liability or
warranties. In this realm, Wickelgren (2006) argues that consumers will waive liability in
order to obtain a lower price because the precautionary decision by the ﬁrm is already made
at that point in time. Consequently, mandatory product liability, which we consider, is a
way to commit to not waiving liability. Product liability aﬀects ﬁrm decision-making in
several ways. For instance, it has been established that product liability may also impact
on product diﬀerentiation (Endres and L¨ udecke 1998). Despite this wide array of analyses
in the ﬁeld of product liability, the topic we wish to analyze has not yet been the subject of
scrutiny.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3.1
presents the analysis, where ﬁrms determine price and care levels for a given level of ﬁrm
liability. Section 3.2 presents decision-making by the social planner. The social planner
decides on the level of ﬁrm liability, taking in account the way in which ﬁrms respond to a
given level of ﬁrm liability. Section 4 concludes the study.
2 The Model
We keep the model simple in order to focus on the ﬁrms’ incentives for overinvestment in care
and the appropriate response on the part of the social planner. The model comprises two
periods, t = 1,2. We consider two ﬁrms and a mass of consumers equal to two. The latter are
4evenly distributed on the interval [0,2], analogous to Hotelling (1929). The ﬁrms’ locations
on the interval are given by 0 and 2, respectively, where the distance of consumers to ﬁrms
indicates the costs incurred by consumers resulting from the misﬁt between consumers’ most
favored variety of the product, on the one hand, and the features of the product actually
produced by a ﬁrm, on the other. Consumers buy one unit of the product in each period
from either of the two ﬁrms. Consuming the product might entail harm for the consumer,
which may vary for each incident. Expected harm is equal to h = 1. The probability of
harm actually occurring is given by (1−xit) per unit of the product, where xit, 0 ≤ xit ≤ 1,
measures care taken by ﬁrm i, i = 1,2 in period t. The choice between ﬁrms is guided,
ﬁrst, by prices charged by the competing ﬁrms; second, by expectations about expected
harm borne by the consumer; and third, by the distances to ﬁrms, given a consumer’s
position on the interval. Furthermore, we assume that in the second period, consumers
may also be guided by reported accident history of ﬁrms in period 1. To reﬂect this in
the simplest way possible, we assume consumers’ preferences are shifted in favor of the ﬁrm
with relatively few accidents in the ﬁrst period. The extent of the shift of the interval is
given by the diﬀerence in accident probabilities in the ﬁrst period, (1 − xi1) − (1 − xj1),
i,j = 1,2, j  = i, weighted by the parameter α ≥ 0. The parameter α represents the force
of the reciprocity considerations discussed in the introduction. Assuming, without loss of
generality, x11 ≥ x21, the new boundaries of the interval in which consumers are located are
given by [−α(x11 − x21),(2 − α(x11 − x21))] in the second period.
Besides competing in care, the level of which determines the probability of an accident,
ﬁrms compete in setting prices. With respect to care, ﬁrm i bears care costs per unit
produced of C(xit) = x2
it, which are increasing and strictly convex in care. Strict liability
applies according to modern Western legal regimes on product liability (Zweigert and K¨ otz
1998; Shavell 2004). The share of harm borne by the ﬁrm in the case of an accident is
denoted by γ and may be less than one, γ ≤ 1. We assume that if harm varies, the precise
level of harm cannot be observed by courts, which therefore take recourse to expected harm
when determining the level of damages.2 We abstract from production costs, so that ﬁrm i
bears x2
it +γ(1−xit) as expected costs per unit of output. Consumers know that ﬁrms bear
2This assumption implies that even for γ = 1, some consumers who experienced an accident are not made
whole and therefore might seek retaliatory action in the second period. However, the analysis and our results
are unaﬀected if we assume that the level of harm is always equal to h = 1.
5a share γ of expected harm but cannot observe care actually taken by the ﬁrm. Consumer
demand for ﬁrm i is therefore dependent on expected care E(xit) and E(xjt) as well as
prices charged, pit and pjt, i,j = 1,2, i  = j. We assume that consumers will form correct
expectations about actual care-taking.
To derive the demand function for each ﬁrm, we analyze the decision made by consumers
regarding where to buy the product. In both periods, a consumer located at point z will buy
the product from ﬁrm 1, located at zero, if costs incurred are lower than buying the product
from ﬁrm 2. This comparison of costs includes the distance costs z, respectively 2 − z, the
prices charged by ﬁrms and expected harm born by the consumer for γ < 1. Accordingly,
the consumer chooses the product of ﬁrm 1 if
z + p1t + (1 − γ)(1 − E(x1t)) < (2 − z) + p2t + (1 − γ)(1 − E(x2t))
so that the critical consumer who is simply indiﬀerent with regard to buying the product
from ﬁrm 1 or 2 is located at
z
∗
t = 1 +
p2t − p1t + (1 − γ)[(1 − E(x2t)) − (1 − E(x1t))]
2
Therefore, given the symmetry of the model, the demand for ﬁrm i in period 1, Di1, is given
by
Di1 = Di1(pi1,pj1) = 1 +
pj1 − pi1 + (1 − γ)[E(xi1)) − E(xj1))]
2
(1)
This formula clearly shows that ﬁrm i may gain consumers from ﬁrm j if its product is
more attractive for the consumer due to a lower price or higher expected care-taking by
ﬁrm i. The latter is important for the consumer because he/she bears the fraction (1 − γ)
of the expected harm which occurs with probability (1 − xi1). Note, that expected care is
not directly determined by ﬁrms. Instead prices charged by ﬁrms have a direct impact on
demand. Proﬁts of ﬁrm i in period 1 follow as
πi1 = (pi1 − x
2
i1 − γ(1 − xi1))Di1 (2)
In the second period, consumers have observed ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-period care choices. The
preference interval shifts according to the parameter α and the number of accidents actually
occurring with the ﬁrms’ products respectively. This changes ﬁrm-speciﬁc demand when
compared to demand in period 1. Allowing for this behavior, demand in period 2 for ﬁrm i
6can be stated as
Di2 = Di2(pi2,pj2,xi1,xj1) = 1 + α(xi1 − xj1) +
pj2 − pi2 + (1 − γ)[E(xi2) − E(xj2)]
2
(3)
directly depending on ﬁrms’ choice of care in period 1. The proﬁts of ﬁrm i in period 2 are
given by
πi2 = (pi2 − x
2
i2 − γ(1 − xi2))Di2 (4)
3 The Analysis
In the following analysis, we will ﬁrst focus on ﬁrm behavior, given a certain level of ﬁrm
liability γ. Later on, we will consider the possibility that the planner decides on the level of
ﬁrm liability γ in order to attain the minimum level of social costs.
3.1 Decentralized Outcome
We ﬁrst analyze decision-making in period 2. Firm i maximizes proﬁts (4) with respect to
price and precaution. The set of ﬁrst-order conditions that simultaneously determine the














=(−2xi2 + γ)Di2 = 0 (6)













i,j = 1,2, i  = j.
There is no strategic interdependence between ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 regarding the level of
care in period 2. Therefore, ﬁrms minimize the sum of care costs and damages per unit
produced. This behavior will be understood by consumers, i.e., in equilibrium, E(xi2) = γ/2
applies. We therefore obtain
p
∗
i2 = 2 +
8α(xi1 − xj1) + 3γ(4 − γ)
12
(9)
7The price of ﬁrm i is higher where the diﬀerence between care levels in period 1 is greater,
because demand is shifted to a larger extent towards the ﬁrm with relatively high care.
Furthermore, equilibrium prices increase with γ because higher compensation requirements
for ﬁrms result in higher marginal costs for the ﬁrm, as can be derived from applying the




(3 + α(xi1 − xj1))
2 (10)
Equilibrium proﬁts in period 2 depend on the diﬀerence in ﬁrst-period care but are not
aﬀected by the level of damages γ. Given rational expectations, this results because any
change in compensation requirements is completely oﬀset by a corresponding change in the
consumers’ willingness to pay.
Next, we turn to decision-making in period 1. At this stage, ﬁrms anticipate that ﬁrst-
period care-taking aﬀects proﬁts in the second period. Consequently, the objective function
to maximize in period 1 is the sum of ﬁrst-period and second-period proﬁts, where second-
period proﬁts are stated using equilibrium levels.
Πi =πi1 + πi2
=(pi1 − x
2
i1 − γ(1 − xi1))Di1 +
2
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(3 + α(xi1 − xj1))
2 (11)
The set of ﬁrst-order conditions, which simultaneously determine the equilibrium out-








i1 − γ(1 − xi1))
= 1 − pi1 +
pj1 + (1 − γ)[E(xi1) − E(xj1)] + x2





= (−2xi1 + γ)Di1 +
4α
9
(3 + α(xi1 − xj1))
= (−2xi1 + γ)
￿
1 +






(3 + α(xi1 − xji)) = 0 (13)
i,j = 1,2, i  = j.
In our setting, ﬁrst-period pricing does not aﬀect proﬁts in the second period. This is
the reason why (12) equals the reaction function in standard duopolistic price competition.
In contrast, ﬁrst-period care has a direct eﬀect on proﬁts in period 2, in addition to its eﬀect
8on proﬁts in period 1. As indicated by (13), the additional beneﬁts from ﬁrst-period care
regarding proﬁts in period 2 induce the ﬁrm to choose a higher care level, x∗
i1 > γ/2 = x∗
i2.
Indeed, acknowledging correct expectations by consumers, i.e. E(xi1) = xi1, we ﬁnd ﬁrst-






















The care level in the ﬁrst period is higher than the level of care a myopic ﬁrm would
choose, which is xi1 = γ/2, whenever α > 0. This reﬂects the eﬀect of ﬁrst-period care on
demand in period 2. Prices in the ﬁrst period reﬂect that higher costs of care are shifted
forward to consumers. Care increases in α, so that an increase in α translates into an increase
in prices.
Given (14) and (15), we are now able to state second-period equilibrium care and price
















The above statement of the equilibrium price in period 2 allows for a quick comparison
with the price chosen in period 1. The ﬁrst-period price is higher than the second period
price if α > 0. The potential switching of consumers induces ﬁrms to take higher care in
period 1, which translates into higher ﬁrst-period prices.
3.2 Planner Intervention
The model is kept simple by assuming that consumers purchase the good in both periods.
This implies that care-taking and pricing decisions do not aﬀect the volume of trade. Fur-
thermore, a variation in the price level only implies a diﬀerent distribution of rents between
ﬁrms and consumers. We also ﬁnd that proﬁts are unaﬀected by the choice of the compensa-
tion requirement of ﬁrms γ because π∗
i1 = π∗
i2 = 2. Consequently, only consumer welfare will
be aﬀected by the choice of γ. Taken together, the eﬃciency-minded planner is concerned
9with the level of care taken and costs resulting from the distance between consumers and






























2 + α(x11 − x21)](x
2
12 + (1 − x12)) + [2 − z
∗
2 − α(x11 − x21)](x
2
22 + (1 − x22))
(20)
where z∗
t is the position of the indiﬀerent consumer in period t. All consumers with z ≤ z∗
t
will buy the product from ﬁrm 1 in period t. The ﬁrst two (last two) lines in (20) state
expected social costs in period 1 (2). These comprise costs due to the misﬁt of the product,
i.e. the deviation of consumers’ locations from ﬁrms, care costs and expected harm. As a ﬁrst
observation, care costs in period 2 only aﬀect expected costs per unit of output produced.
We can therefore conclude that ﬁrst-best care is given by xFB
12 = xFB
22 = 1/2, according to







2 − 2 = 0 (21)
This allows us to deduce that the optimal level of z∗
2 is zFB
2 = 1. Using these ﬁndings, the






1 − 2 + (x
2
11 + (1 − x11)) − (x
2





1(2x11 − 1) − 2α





1)(2x21 − 1) + 2α
2(x11 − x21) = 0 (24)
which are solved by zFB
1 = 1, xFB
11 = xFB
21 = 1/2. Again, the ﬁrst-best level of care minimizes
the expected social costs, i.e., the sum of precaution costs and expected harm per unit,
whereas zFB
1 minimizes distances between locations of consumers and ﬁrms.
The above describes the ﬁrst-best allocation of consumers to ﬁrms and levels of precau-
tion. The power of the regulator is not usually all-encompassing enough to simply impose
this ﬁrst-best outcome. As a consequence, we assume henceforth that the sole instrument of
the planner is the share of expected harm which is borne by the ﬁrm, i.e., γ. In other terms,
10the planner accepts the way in which price and care levels are chosen by ﬁrms but tries to
reach a second-best level of social costs by the use of the optimal γ.3 This setting implies














and equilibrium prices as given. Given the symmetric outcome, the critical consumer is
indeed located at zFB
t = 1 in both periods. With respect to care, note that ﬁrst-period
care is excessive relative to ﬁrst-best care if the eﬀect of switching consumers is suﬃciently
pronounced, i.e., x∗
i1 > xFB
i1 whenever α > 3
4(1 − γ). If the planner were to choose γ = 1,
ﬁrst-period care is always excessive for α diﬀerent from zero. In contrast, second-period care
falls short of ﬁrst-best care as soon as γ < 1. The planner will trade-oﬀ these aspects when
choosing γ for a given α in the pursuit of minimizing total social costs.
















with respect to γ. This results in the second-best solution
γ




We ﬁnd that it is optimal to fully compensate accident victims only if there is no eﬀect
due to switching consumers, i.e., if α = 0. That is, if consumers react to the number of
accidents observed in the ﬁrst period by shifting demand in period 2, care incentives will be
excessive if the full burden of expected harm were imposed on the ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 It is second best with respect to the minimization of social costs that the ﬁrm
bears less than full expected harm whenever α > 0.
Proof. This proposition uses the argument leading to (26).
We have assumed that the planner is not in the position to choose ﬁrm liability contingent
on the period. However, it is clear from our argumentation that if the planner can decide
on liability contingent on the period, γt, t = 1,2, the optimal combination of levels of
3Daughety and Reinganum (2006) consider a planner who is similarly restricted in his/her means.





. In other terms, the planner
would impose full liability in the second period and impose less than full liability in the
ﬁrst period, if α > 0, to lessen the combined impact of liability and reputation. In this
way, policymakers optimally manage the incentives from market forces and product liability.
Moreover, the results imply that liability should be diﬀerent for ﬁrms that sell “once in a
lifetime” goods versus ﬁrms that sell products which are purchased on a more regular basis.
The point is that less than full compensation is socially optimal in the presence of strong
market forces due to repeated purchases.
4 Conclusion
It is an empirical regularity that compensation of accident victims is incomplete. Usually
there are components of a victim’s costs such as pain and suﬀering or time spent ﬁling
the claim which are not fully compensated by the injurer. This practice is in contrast to
recommendations in the literature, arguing that consumers having imperfect information
should lead to full liability of ﬁrms. This paper starts with imperfectly informed consumers
and additionally incorporates behavioral ﬁndings suggesting potentially retaliatory consumer
actions. Consumers may punish ﬁrms whose performance is dwarfed by that of competitors
by switching the supplier. Firms care about upholding customer relationships and, given
full liability, may thus be motivated to take precaution in excess of the level that minimizes
social costs. An adequate policy response is to reduce the level of compensation below
the level of harm. If regulators have suﬃcient information, such reductions in the level of
compensation should depend on the speciﬁcs of the case, while they are advisable across the
board otherwise. Consequently, this paper provides an explanation for the observed practice
by taking into account the eﬀects of market forces.
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